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Notes on Formal Constructivism
D. Joyner and P Lejarraga
Dept. Mathematics
U.S. Naval Academy
Annapolis, MD
ABSTRACT

Our aim is to sketch some ideas related to how we (as in,
we two) think we (as in, we humans) think.
"That theory is useless. It isn't even wrong."
- Wolfgang Pauli.
Our hope in this paper is to provide a theory, admittedly somewhat vague, of how we think about mathematics. We also hope our ideas do not cause the
reader to be reminded of Pauli's quote above.
These notes were motivated by the interesting book
by Changeaux and Connes [CC].

follows: The physical world is modeled as much as
possible by mathematics. Mathematicians merely discover what is already in existence.
The constructivist position might be summarized as
follows : Models for the physical world are constructions of the mind (only) and all such mental constructs
exist solely as electro-chemo-biological patterns of
neurons, ... in the brain. To the question, "Why is mathematics so well-suited to the description of physics?",
the constructivist might counter that physicists tend
to examine reproducible phenomena which tend to
have "universal" characteristics. Hence mathematics,
which is also universal, is admirably suited for physical description.

REALISM VS CONSTRUCTIVISM

Realism: Mathematical objects exist independently of
experience (or "physical reality") which we process
using our senses (smell, touch, sight, ... ) and interpret
using our brain. For example, Descartes speaks of a
triangle as an "immutable and eternal" figure whose
existence is independent of the mind which imagines
it. Similar statements are made regarding God by
many religious experts.
Constructivism: Mathematical objects exist solely in
the mind as a certain electro-chemo-biological pattern
of neurons, synapses, chemicals, ... in the brain. For
an extreme example, Hume believed that ideas are
merely copies of sense impressions.
Examples: Alain Cannes (and probably most mathematicians) are realists. For example, the famous quote
of Kronecker's, "The integers are made by God, all
else is made by man," indicates a realist point-of-view.
On the other hand, the biologist Jean Pierre Changeux
and philosopher David Hume are constructivists
(though Hume is the more extreme). Poincare was
possibly a constructivist in this sense (see [D], chapter 9).
The realist position might be roughly summarized as
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POINTS OF AGREEMENT

•

Mathematics provides a "universal language", i.e.,
a grammar and set of terms which can be understood by anyone (sufficiently trained), independently of their cultural background.

•

There is a "physical world" independent of our
mind (which, however, we sense using our brain
and sensory organs).

•

Mathematical objects can be represented as a certain electro-chemo-biological pattern of neurons,
synapses, chemicals, ... in the brain.

•

A given mathematical construction can be represented as a program in a "Turing machine".
(Using an over-simplification, these representations are modeled using neural networks, which
are related to Turing machines [M].)

FORMAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
AssoRTED THOUGHTS OF OuR OwN

•

Though mathematics may indeed be universal, its
development and current state is inspired and influenced by culture and the human experience.
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There may be experiences outside the human
realm (the realm includes other methods of detection, such as computers, microscopes, cyclotrons,
... ) which might lead to mathematics which we
humans might never "discover/invent/realize".

defines the model to be a collection of electrochemo-biological patterns in the brain. Thus the
"mind" is part of the functioning of the "body"
and hence there is no dualism.
•

•

The brain is capable of translating (or "producing") from sensual patterns certain "grammar" (or,
loosely speaking, patterns of patterns). These may
be thought of as rules that mental objects satisfy,
though they are more intuitive feelings than rigorous laws. (For example, one never expects to see
a mouse tum into an elephant, so such a concatenation of mental objects in our senses would be
regarded as ungrammatical.)

•

The brain is capable of translating certain universal mental objects into symbolic objects (such as
translating sounds into written words). Grammar
satisfied by the mental objects can be translated
into grammar for the symbols.

•

Suppose that we do indeed perceive "reality" via
our brain and senses. Suppose, in the extreme, that
all mental objects are merely copies of sense impressions. ("Copy" is being loosely interpreted
here, as it is assumed that a sense impression is an
electro-chemo-biological pattern in the brain and
the brain may be less reliable than a camera or
xerox machine!) These objects may possess properties (at least as far as we may sense them). Assume that we may posulate (using our imagination) new properties for these objects. Define a
~'model" to be a logically coherent collection of
objects and their properties. It seems reasonable
. to hypothesize that all of mathematics belongs to
some such model.
If these assumptions are accepted, one may then
create a sort of "platonic model" of mathematics,
even though the actual objects may exist only as
mental constructs (this idea which you have just
read about may be such a "model"!). Call this formal constructivism.

•

In formal constructivism the mind-body dualism
problem might be regarded as follows. The mind
is merely a collection of mental objects, constructions and models. The body is a collection of
nerves, bones, synapses, .... Constructive realism
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If the "realm of human experience~' consists of all
human ideas, experiences, and activities, then
within this realm statements may be divided into
two classes, T (testable) and NT (non-testable):

(T) Those statements regarding experiences which
are in principle testable by some physical device or thought experiment. We assume that
the thought experiment is one which tests the
truth or falsity of a well-defined statement
within an axiomatically presented (logical,
mathematical or philosophical, for example)
internally consistent universal model. In this
case the validity of the test would, of course,
only be relative to the axioms assumed. For
example, "The person reading this sentence is
a human being," is both testable and probably
true!
(NT) Those statements regarding experiences
which are not testable in the sense above. For
example, "Triangles existed 2 billion years
ago," is not testable.
All statements in the second class cannot be knowable in the sense that they can be tested. However,
depending on one's axioms, many models are testable. For example, if one hypothesizes the existence of God in a consistent model, then of course
the statement, "God exists," is axiomatically true.
A mathematical analogy of this testable/non-testable
idea: mathematical statements may be divided into
two classes, D (decidable) and UD (undecidable): ' ·
(D) Those statements which may be proven true or
false logically from the axioms of some mathematical model with a recursive set of axioms (say
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory).
(UD) Those statements which cannot be proven true
or false logically from the axioms of some mathematical model with a finite set of axioms. Such
statements could be:
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-known to be true (but "self-referential" and not
provable, as in Godel's incompleteness theorem),

cessing even more information.

- known to be false (but not disprovable),

The point is that the way we think about mathematics falls into one of several categories. We either

-poorly formed (using the grammar of the model),

•

formally manipulate symbols (such as algebraic
expressions), following grammatical rules,

- well-formed but independent of the axioms
(such as the Continuum Hypothesis).

•

formally manipulate mathematical objects (such
as knots), following grammatical rules,

•

experimentally determine grammatical rules using sequences of mathematical objects,

•

select mathematical objects from sequences using
some evaluation procedure (possibly for the purpose of manipulating them or determining grammatical rules for them).

LANGUAGE AND GRAMMAR
So far, we have simply regarded the brain as a processing unit, which is capable of translating (or producing) certain patterns from sequences of mental
objects. These patterns may be translated and represented (not necessarily faithfully) using more universal mental objects. Call these objects "symbols". This
capability of the brain might be regarded as an "abstraction device": a machine which is capable of noticing patterns from sequences of inputs. Of course,
some patterns are more relevant than others. The brain
is also capable of distingishing, evaluating, and selecting patterns.
The brain also has a tendency towards using universal mental objects (constructing order from chaos, if
you will). Therefore, it is natural for the brain to process stimuli in terms of symbols and grammar. This
leads naturally to language, which is useful for pro-

All these involve one of the brain's capabilities discussed above.
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I tell my students the story
of Newton versus Leibniz,
the war of symbols,
lasting five generations,
between The Continent
and British Isles,
involving deeply hurt
sensibilities, grievous
blows to national pride;
on such weighty issues
as publication priority
and working systems
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of logical notation:
whether the derivative
must be denoted by a "prime",
an apostrophe atop
the right hand corner
of a function, evaluated
by Newton's fluxions method
or by a formal quotient
of differentials dy I dx,
intimating future possibilities,
terminology that guides
the mind.
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